S&P downgrades credit ratings of Natiobal managing holding KazAgro to level "ВВВ-/А-3"; outlook "Negative"
15.07.15 11:14
/Standard & Poor's, London, July 10, 15, heading by KASE/ – Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services said today that it lowered its long- and short-term foreign and
local currency issuer credit ratings on Kazakhstan's KazAgro National
Management Holding (KazAgro, or the holding company) to 'BBB-/A-3' from
'BBB/A-2'.
We also lowered the Kazakhstan national scale rating on KazAgro to 'kzAA'
from kzAA+'. We removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed
with negative implications on July 1, 2015.
The outlook is negative.
The downgrade primarily reflects our assessment of the somewhat reduced
likelihood of the Kazakhstan government extending timely and extraordinary
support to KazAgro National Management Holding (KazAgro, or the holding
company), if needed, against a background of a weaker economic outlook and
fiscal revenue pressures. KazAgro is the 100% government-owned holding
company of KazAgro Group (the group).
While we believe that the group--the main operating companies of which are
Food Contract Corporation, KazAgroFinance, and Agrarian Credit Corp.
(KACC)--continues to play a critical role for the government, we have revised
down our assessment of the holding company's role to very important from
critical. Accordingly, we now consider that there is an extremely high
likelihood that the government of Kazakhstan would provide timely and
extraordinary support to KazAgro, if needed.
The negative outlook mirrors that on the sovereign and indicates that we would
lower the ratings on KazAgro if we were to downgrade Kazakhstan.
We rate KazAgro under our criteria, "Group Rating Methodology" and "Rating
Government-Related Entities: Methodology And Assumptions".
In our view, Kazakhstan's fiscal revenue pressures--primarily stemming from the
pronounced decline in oil prices over the last year--may reduce the likelihood
that the government would provide timely and extraordinary support to some
quasi-fiscal institutions and government-related entities (GREs). By
"extraordinary" we mean support to ensure the full and timely servicing of debt
in a stress scenario. We do not view as extraordinary support government
transfers that aim to expand or continue an institution's activities, such as
government spending programs channeled through GREs.
The group and its parent company KazAgro (the holding company) were
established in 2007 by presidential decree. The shares of seven 100%
government-owned institutions operating in the agricultural sector were
transferred to the holding company shortly after its creation. The subsidiaries
broadly focus on providing lending and financial support to the socially
important agricultural sector (which employs around 45% of the population of
Kazakhstan) and include the Food Contract Corporation, a vehicle through
which the government can intervene in the grain market.
We assess the likelihood of extraordinary government support to the
consolidated group as almost certain. This is based on our view of the group's:
- Integral link with the government. The state owns 100% of the holding
company, which in turn fully owns its subsidiaries. We do not currently
expect the ownership structure to change. The holding company has a
special status as a financial agency, which confers certain benefits
including the ability to borrow from the state without collateral. Previously,
the government has provided support to the group. For instance, the
government made a Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) 20 billion equity injection into
the holding company following the tenge devaluation in February 2014.
Several ministers and the first deputy prime minister are on the holding
company's board of directors;
- Critical public policy role as the government's primary vehicle for providing
financial support to and developing the agricultural sector and rural areas.
KazAgro's subsidiaries support the agricultural sector through leasing,
providing short- and long-term lending, extending micro-financing, and
intervening in the grain market. We view the group as key to implementing
several government strategies, including AgroBusiness 2020. According to
management's estimates, the group's current share in total lending to the
agricultural sector is close to 50%..
Consequently, the group credit profile (GCP) is 'bbb', which aligns with the
sovereign credit rating on Kazakhstan. The GCP reflects the creditworthiness of
the consolidated operations group and takes into account extraordinary
government support. We believe, however, that while the holding company's
creditworthiness is closely tied to that of the consolidated group, it is
marginally weaker than the group's. This results in a one-notch difference
between our rating on KazAgro and our assessment of the GCP. The difference
primarily stems from our assessment of the role the holding company has for the
government. The difference also reflects the holding company's nonoperating
status--that is, KazAgro's primary function lies in managing its subsidiaries.
In our view, the group's importance to the government largely stems from the
importance of its subsidiaries rather than that of the holding company. We
therefore assess the holding company's role for the government as very
important--that is, lower than the group's critical role. Our assessment
reflects the holding company's function of optimizing the operational
efficiency of its subsidiaries as well as removing any potential competition
between them. It also reflects the holding company's importance in coordinating
the government's policies in the agricultural sector under several strategic
state programs.
We consider that there is some reputational risk for the government from not
supporting the holding company in a stress scenario. However, given the
current macroeconomic and fiscal settings in Kazakhstan, we do not believe this
potential risk is high enough for us to assess the holding company's role as
critical. In particular, we believe that the default of the holding company
would not necessarily have a critical impact on the government as the
subsidiaries undertaking operating activities would not likely automatically be
in default, and would be able to keep carrying out their business.
We also believe that if financial stress emerged at the subsidiary and holding
company levels simultaneously, the government might choose to rescue the
subsidiary first. In our view, depending on the severity of such a scenario, the
government could consider changing the ownership structure of the group's
entities to avoid extra fiscal costs. The provision of direct support to
subsidiaries or a change in the ownership structure could, in turn, require
legislative changes.
Our unsupported group credit profile (unsupported GCP), which reflects the
creditworthiness of the consolidated group without taking into account the
potential for extraordinary government support, is unchanged at 'b+'. Our
assessment of the group's capitalization as strong remains the main stand-
alone rating strength. It reflects the group's relatively low leverage ratios,
supported by regular capital injections from the government. We expect debt to
adjusted total equity to be about 2.0x-2.2x in 2015-2017, up from 1.6x at the
end of 2014. The group's funding remains moderate, reflecting significant
foreign currency risks inherent in its funding profile. In particular, the
group's short open currency position has increased to KZT223 billion or 63% of
adjusted total equity (ATE), up from 30% of ATE a year ago. That said, we also
anticipate the government would compensate the group in case of future currency
losses, which we see as an offsetting factor.
We expect the group will continue maintaining adequate liquidity buffers. Its
broad liquid assets covered short-term wholesale funding by 1.7x at the end of
2014, which compares well to peers. In line with our expectations, the liquid
assets decreased to 19% of the balance sheet on Dec. 31, 2014, from 49% a ear
earlier because KazAgro placed the funds from its Eurobond issuance into
long-term loans to banks to facilitate the restructuring of old loans to
customers in the agricultural sector. This was done in accordance with
Kazakhstan's Agrobusiness 2020 strategy.
The negative outlook mirrors that on the sovereign. We would likely revise the
outlook, raise or lower the ratings on KazAgro, if we took similar actions on
the sovereign.
We currently consider the likelihood of the ratings on KazAgro being further
lowered independently from the sovereign ratings to be low. This could,
however, occur if we saw signs of waning government support to the group. We
could also lower the ratings if we perceived the role of KazAgro for the
government as reducing in contrast to the role of the overall group.
We could consider an upgrade if we perceived that the holding company's role
for the government and its relative importance within the group had increased.
Additional contact:
International Public Finance Ratings Europe;
PublicFinanceEurope@standardandpoors.com
[2015-07-15]